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I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issue
When co-investigating judges disagree with each other regarding whether to
indict or not, and the Pre-Trial Chamber does not reach a super-majority decision
on the issue, shall the indictment stand or not?* This paper will address the
settlement of disagreement between co-investigating judges under different
circumstances, the existence of potential conflict between Law on the
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC
Law”) and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules
(“Internal Rules”) regarding this issue, as well as the reasonable and good-faith
construction of the rules if they are both silent on the issue of indictment.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Although not directly addressed, the text and language of both ECCC
Law and Internal Rules suggest that the default settlement is to let
the investigation and prosecution proceed. And based on a reasonable
construction of these two instruments, there should be no apparent
conflicts.
2. Precedents and plain language show that when co-investigating
judges or co-prosecutors disagree with each other regarding whether
the investigation or prosecution shall proceed, “the only way the

*

If there is a disagreement between the National (Cambodian) and International
Co-Investigating judges as to whether a charged person should be indicted for crimes at
the ECCC, and no super-majority decision has been formed in the Pre-Trial Chamber
(PTC) to resolve this disagreement, should the charged person be sent to trial or not,
based on the ECCC Statute and Internal Rules? Are the ECCC Statute and Internal
Rules consistent with each other on this issue?
5

investigation is halted is if the Pre-Trial Chamber decides by
supermajority vote that it should end.” No precedents addressed
issues regarding indictments. Both ECCC Law and Internal Rules are
also silent in this regard. However, reasonable construction of the
rules and analysis of the consistency of the rules indicate the
indictment shall proceed to the Trial-Chamber for decision if no
super-majority vote is reached when settling disagreement between
co-investigating judges.
3. The Pre-Trial Chamber has ruled that “the Internal Rules constitute
the primary instrument to which reference should be made in
determining procedures before ECCC where there is a difference
between the procedures in the Internal Rules and the CPC”. 1
Therefore, by this ruling, the Internal Rules are the predominant
procedural foundations of the Court when there is a conflict between
Internal Rules and Cambodian procedural law. There are no ruling
addresses the issue of conflict between the Internal Rules and ECCC
Law and the chamber seems to be comfortable with the different
wording of these two instruments. However, again, a reasonable
construction of these two instruments will not cause any conflicts.
4. There is one policy consideration behind rules settling disagreement
between co-investigating judges or co-prosecutors. That is, to
prevent one co-investigating judge or one co-prosecutor, usually the
national one, from hindering the investigation or prosecution by

ECCC Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea et al., 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ, 26 August
2008, Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal against Order Refusing Request for Annulment,
at 14 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 8].
1

6

refusing to reach agreement with another judge or prosecutor.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the same rationale should
be respected even when the issue here is indictment, instead of
investigation because otherwise the mechanism will be meaningless.

II.

Factual Background
The procedure on charges at the ECCC differs substantially from other
international courts and tribunals. The indictment procedure in ECCC contains
several steps. The co-investigating judges forward the case file to co-prosecutors
after they come to one conclusion of the investigation. The co-prosecutors then
decide whether to request co-investigating judges to indict the charged persons or
dismiss the case.2 The case file is returned to co-investigating judges with final
submission. Then the co-investigating judges conclude the investigation by
issuing a Closing Order either to indict the charged persons or dismiss the case.3
All investigations shall be the joint responsibility of two investigating judges,
however, “the dual officer system carries an obvious risk of disagreements.
Accordingly, a special dispute settlement procedure exists in which the five-judge
Pre-Trial Chamber hears and decides the matter.”4 A decision of the specially
convened Pre-Trial Chamber requires the affirmative vote of at least four judges,
which is usually referred to as “super-majority vote”. Cambodian procedural law
has no similar procedures.

2

Internal Rules 66.

3

Internal Rules 67.

Göran Sluiter，Håkan Friman，Suzannah Linton，Sergey Vasiliev，Salvatore
Zappalà, International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, at 395 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 9].
4
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The Article 23 new of ECCC Law provides:
A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber, against which there is no appeal,
requires the affirmative vote of at least four judges. The decision shall be
communicated to the Director of the Office of Administration, who shall
publish it and communicate it to the Co-Investigating Judges. They shall
immediately proceed in accordance with the decision of the Pre-Trial
Chamber. If there is no majority as required for a decision, the investigation
shall proceed.5
The Internal Rules 72 provides:
A decision of the Chamber shall require the affirmative vote of at least four
judges. This decision is not subject to appeal. If the required majority is not
achieved before the Chamber, in accordance with Article 23 new of the ECCC
Law, the default decision shall be that the order or investigative act done by one
Co-Investigating Judge shall stand, or that the order or investigative act proposed
to be done by one Co-Investigating Judge shall be executed.6
III. Substantive Legal Discussion
A. Language of ECCC Law and Internal Rules
ECCC Law provides that if there is no majority as required for a decision in
Pre-Trial Chamber, the investigation shall proceed. The default settlement is
allowing investigation instead of stopping it.7 ECCC Law is silent on issues other
than investigation, such as indictment.
Internal Rules provides that if the required majority is not reached in
Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with Article 23 new of the ECCC Law, the
default decision shall be that the order or investigative act done or proposed by
LAW ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE
COURTS OF CAMBODIA FOR THE PROSECUTION OF CRIMES COMMITTED
DURING THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, with inclusion of
amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2].
5

EXTRADINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA INTERNAL
RULES (REV.9), as revised on 16 January 2015 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1].
6

7

Article 23 new of ECCC Law.
8

one co-investigating Judge shall stand or shall be executed.8 The Internal Rules
include more aspects during the process, compared to ECCC Law which only
mentions investigation, however, the rules do not clearly provide which one of
the investigating judges’ orders shall stand or be executed if both judges issue
their orders.
First, the language “in accordance with” indicates that Internal Rules should
have the same default settlement as ECCC Law, that is, to let the investigation
proceed unless there is super-majority decision on the contrary.
Second, the language of ECCC Law is silent on the issues other than
investigation. However, to construe the language of Internal Rules word by word
will render this rule meaningless and strange since it only provides that the act or
proposed act by either of the co-investigating judges shall stand or be executed
but not which one. It is very likely that both of the judges will act or propose to
either indict or dismiss, therefore, it is unreasonable to say that the rules simply
favor the side who propose or act at first and disfavor the other. This construction
of the rules will render the disagreement settlement mechanism a timing
competition.
The reasonable construction of the language of Internal Rules should be that
the order or investigative act done or proposed to be done does not include the
decision of not to act or stop acting, such as to not indict a person or dismiss the
case. This construction will make ECCC Law and Internal Rules consistent with
each other. They will be consistent when one judge who proposes to stop
investigation at first and the other judges proposes to continue investigation later.
They will still be consistent when one judge proposes to stop investigation or to

8

Internal Rules 72 (4)(d).
9

dismiss and the other judge disagrees but does not act or propose.
B. Structural Consistency of Internal Rules
Besides Internal Rules 72 itself, other part of the Internal Rules also provides
some guidance and suggestion regarding the issue here and the intent of the
drafters of the rules because the Internal Rules should be a consistent and
systematic procedural process.
Rule 74 provides some grounds for Pre-Trial appeals. The matters which
have already been heard by the Chamber pursuant to the dispute settlement
provisions in Rule 72 are not subject to appeal and excluded as a ground for
Pre-Trial appeal, 9 however, the co-prosecutors, the charged person and civil
parties may appeal some of the investigative action or order of the investigating
judges, including the Closing Order issued by co-investigating judges. Internal
Rules 77(13) provides the procedures and applications for these appeals:
A decision of the Chamber requires the affirmative vote of at least 4 (four)
judges. This decision is not subject to appeal. If the required majority is not
attained, the default decision of the Chamber shall be as follows:
a) As regards an appeal against or an application for annulment of an order or
investigative action other than an indictment, that such order or investigative
action shall stand.
b) As regards appeals against indictments issued by the Co-Investigating
Judges, that the Trial Chamber be seised on the basis of the Closing Order of
the Co-Investigating Judges.10
Where the order being appealed is not regarding indictments and if the
super-majority vote is not reached in the Pre-Trial Chamber regarding the appeal,
the default settlement is the order being challenged or appealed will still stand.
However, the rules further create an exception as second category that at the
Pre-Trial Chamber stage, issues regarding indictments, which do not fall within
9

10

Internal Rules 74(1).
Internal Rules 77(13).
10

the first category, will not presumably stand but will proceed to Trial Chamber
unless there is a super-majority vote at Pre-Trial Chamber decides otherwise. It is
clear that a Closing Order of indictment falls within the second category while it
is not clear on the plain language that a Closing Order of dismissal falls within
which one of the two categories. However, if a Closing Order of dismissal (to not
indict) falls within the first category, then the second category (essentially an
exception) will become redundant. Under this construction of the rules, the
Closing Order, either a dismissal or an indictment, will always stand without a
super-majority vote to the contrary. This is already fully covered by the first
category. Therefore, the reasonable construction of Internal Rules 77 should be
that if a Closing Order of either dismissal or indictment is appealed against, and if
there is no super-majority vote in the Pre-Trial Chamber to the contrary, the Trial
Chamber will be seised on the basis of the Closing Order.
Based on the analysis of Internal Rules 77(13) above, and since the Internal
Rules 74(1) first precludes the issues already heard by Pre-Trial Chamber
pursuant to the dispute settlement provisions in Rule 72 as a ground for appeal,11
it is unreasonable if the Pre-Trial Chamber cannot decide the appeal regarding
issues of either to indict or dismiss without a super-majority vote while the
Pre-Trial Chamber can, at an earlier stage, decide the exactly same issue without
a super-majority vote when settling disagreement between co-investigating
judges. The settlement of disagreement on the same issue is not subject to appeal
later because of Rules 74(1). Therefore, the consistency of the Internal Rules as a
whole suggests that the issue of whether to indict or dismiss should presumably
proceed to Trial-Chamber for adjudication if the two co-investigating judges

11

Internal Rules 74(1).
11

cannot come to a consensus and there is no super-majority vote in the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
C. Predominant Procedural Rules
In Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea et al., the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the
Internal Rules are a “self-contained regime of procedural law related to the
unique circumstances of the ECCC”12 and shifted the Internal Rules to have
the rank of law. This ruling changed “the ranking of the procedural legal
basis of the Court, deviating from the Agreement and the ECCC Law, and
determined that the Internal Rules are the first and predominant procedural
foundations of the Court.”13 This opinion directly ruled that when conflicts
between Cambodian procedural law and Internal Rules occur, the Internal
Rules are the predominant procedural rules.
According to ECCC Law, the co-investigating judges are to follow the
“existing procedure in force”,14 which now should be a reference to the
Internal Rules instead of Cambodian procedural law according to the
precedent mentioned above. Only when the “existing procedures in force” do
not deal with a particular matter, or if there is some uncertainty regarding
their interpretation or application, or if there is a question regarding their
consistency with international standards, the co-investigating judges may
seek guidance in procedural rules established at the international level.15

12

Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea et al., supra.

Thorsten Bonacker, Christoph Safferling, Victims of International Crimes: An
Interdisciplinary Discourse, at 178 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 10].
13

14

Article 23 of ECCC Law.

15

Id.
12

Unfortunately, the issue regarding settlement between co-investigating judges
is too unique that there is no similar procedure in the international standard.
There are no precedents directly address the issues regarding conflicts
between Internal Rules and ECCC Law, as well as which one should
supersede the other if the conflicts do exist.
The preamble of Internal Rules points out that additional rules are
adopted pursuant to Article 20 new, 23 new, and 33 new of the ECCC Law to
deal with some particular matters not covered by Cambodian procedural
law.16 The Internal Rules 2 emphasizes this principal again when a question
arises which is not addressed by Internal Rules.17
The language of the precedent mentioned above somewhat suggests
the Internal Rules should supersede ECCC Law when there is a conflict,
however, on the other hand, the use of term “in accordance with” may also
suggest that the Internal Rules should be construed as consistent with ECCC
Law as possible.
In the only two precedents involving settlement of disagreement
discussed in the next section, the chamber gave reference to both the ECCC
Law and Internal Rules at the same time, and did not gave more weight to
either of them over the other. The chamber seems to be comfortable with the
consistency between Internal Rules and ECCC Law regarding the issue of
disagreement settlement between co-investigating judges.

D. Precedents Involving Settlement of Disagreement

16

Internal Rules Preamble.

17

Internal Rules 2.
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In Case 003, there were two instances involving settlement of
disagreement.
The first instance involved settlement of disagreement between
co-prosecutors. The international co-prosecutor intends to submit two new
Introductory Submissions and a second Supplementary Submissions. The
national co-prosecutor disagrees with prosecuting the crimes identified in the
new submissions and therefore refuses to sign any additional submissions.
The international prosecutor submitted statement of disagreement and the
Office of Administration forwarded to the Pre-Trial Chamber for settlement.
The Pre-Trial Chamber cited Article 7 of the ECCC Agreement, Article 20
new of the ECCC Law and Internal Rules 71 as governing law. The Pre-Trial
Chamber came to the conclusion that “the affirmative vote of at least four
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber is required to reach a decision to block the
execution of a decision which is the subject of a disagreement between
co-prosecutors” and “if this super-majority is not reached, the default
decision is that the Introductory Submission will be forwarded to the
co-investigating judges for judicial investigation.”18
The court seems to be comfortable with the consistency between the
ECCC Agreement, ECCC Law and Internal Rules since here it is clear that
only one of the co-prosecutors propose to act. However, more importantly,
the court pointed out “the international co-prosecutor could have forwarded
the New Introductory Submissions after having given thirty day notice to the
national co-prosecutor if no disagreement had been put before the Pre-Trial

Case 003, Considerations of the Pre-Trial Chamber Regarding the Disagreement
Between the Co-Prosecutors Pursuant to Rule 71 (18 Aug 2009) [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 4].
18

14

Chamber” and “although the proper procedure would have been for the
national co-prosecutor, who raises objections to forwarding the New
Submissions, to file her Written Statement first, the way the disagreement
was brought before it will not affect the way the Pre-Trial Chamber shall
consider the matter.” Therefore, it is clear that which side raises the
disagreement first is not a factor that should be considered when applying the
rules.
The second instance involved settlement of disagreement between
co-investigating judges. After the resignation of a co-investigating judge, the
reserve international co-investigating judge forwarded a document titled
“Order on Resuming the Judicial Investigation” seeking the national
co-investigating judge’s review and signature to issue it. The national judges
stated that before an official appointment, any procedural action taken by the
reserve international co-investigating judge is not legally valid. The reserve
international co-investigating judge then submitted a Record of Disagreement
to the Office of Administration. Like the first instance, the court cited Article
7 of the ECCC Agreement, Article 23 new of the ECCC Law and the Internal
Rules 72 as governing law. The court found that the reserve international
co-investigating judge, during the absence of international co-investigating
judge, is empowered to perform duties and submit disagreement. Then the
court recalled and adopted the observations made by the Pre-Trial Chamber
in the first instance that the default decision here means that the order
proposed by the reserve international co-investigating judge shall be
executed.19

19

Case 003, Opinion of Pre-Trial Chamber Judges Downing and Chung on the
15

E. Policy Considerations
In

the

final

submission

the

co-prosecutor

may

request

the

co-investigating judges to either indict the charged person or to dismiss the
case. Accordingly, the co-investigating judges will conclude the investigation
by issuing a Closing Order either in the form of an indictment or dismissing
the case.
The co-investigating judges only have two options in the closing order,
either to indict or to dismiss. If either one of the co-investigating judges
cannot prevent the investigation at first place, then either one of the
co-investigating judges should not have power to prevent indictment at the
end, otherwise would make the whole process unreasonable and vulnerable
to political influences. The ECCC Law specifically provides that the
co-investigating judges “shall have high moral character, a spirit of
impartiality and integrity, and experience. They shall be independent in the
performance of their functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from
any government or any other source.”20 Identical expression also appears in
Article 10 new and Article 19 of ECCC Law regarding appointment of judges
and co-prosecutors. The drafters of the rules surely have foreseen, and the
rules are designed to prevent that one of the co-investigating judges may try
to control the direction of the investigation due to political influences.
Moreover, the Trial-Chamber has to reach a super-majority vote to
convict the accused and if the super-majority vote is not reached, the default
Disagreement Between the Co-Investigating Judges Pursuant to Internal Rule 72 (10
Feb 2012) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 5].
20

Article 25 of ECCC Law.
16

decision is the accused is acquitted. 21 Therefore, the accused may be
acquitted at the Trial-Chamber level without a super-majority vote. It will be
unreasonable that the indictment could be simply dismissed by one
co-investigating judge’s refusing to come to agreement at the Pre-Trial
Chamber level without a super-majority vote since there will be enough
safeguards with respect to due process rights at Trial-Chamber level.
F. Different Scenarios
Scenario One: One co-investigating judge intends to stop the
investigation and the other disagrees and submits a disagreement for
settlement, and the Pre-Trial Chamber does not reach a super-majority vote.
The Internal Rules and ECCC Law directly address the issue on
investigation unambiguously. It is clear, based on the rule as well as the
precedent directly addressed this issue, that if the disagreement is put before
the Pre-Trial Chamber and there is no super-majority vote, the default
decision is that the investigation shall proceed.
Scenario Two: One co-investigating judge intends to dismiss the case,
and the other disagrees and submits a disagreement for settlement, and the
Pre-Trial Chamber does not reach a super-majority vote.
The rules’ plain language is not clear on this issue because the issue is
regarding indictment. Based on the reasonable construction of the rules
discussed in the previous sections, the Pre-Trial Chamber should not have the
power to decide the issue on either to indict or to dismiss without a
super-majority vote. The precedents discussed above also suggest that the
chamber considers the Internal Rules and ECCC Law consistent with each

21

Internal Rules 98.
17

other. Therefore, the case should be sent to the Trial-Chamber for
adjudication.
Scenario Three: One co-investigating judge intends to dismiss the case,
and the other disagrees, but the one who intends to dismiss submits a
disagreement for settlement, then the Pre-Trial Chamber does not reach a
super-majority vote.
As has been pointed out in the first of the two precedents, which one of
judges submits the disagreement for settlement earlier is not a relevant factor
in deciding the issue. Therefore, the result of this scenario is the same as
Scenario Two, and the case should go forward to the Trial-Chamber for
adjudication.
Scenario Four: One co-investigating judge decides to dismiss the case
before the other judge finishes investigation or before he can issue a closing
order.
The Pre-Trial Chamber has found that “the co-investigating judges are
under no obligation to seize the Pre-Trial Chamber when they do not agree
on an issue before them.”22 The use of word “may” in the Internal Rules
suggests that the procedure provided to settle disagreements is not mandatory
but rather optional. However, the chamber later ruled that there is no
presumption to move forward when there is no disagreement submitted.23
“The ability of a prosecutor or investigative judge to act alone was flatly

Case 002, Decision on Ieng Sary's Appeal Against the Closing Order (11 Apr, 2011).
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 6].
22

Case 003, Decision on Time Extension Request and Investigative Requests by the
International Co-Prosecutor Regarding Case 003 (6 Jun, 2011) [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7].
23
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rejected for the first time by Judges Blunk and You and all the national
Pre-Trial Chamber judges.24 That is to say, an action by one co-investigating
judge cannot proceed unless it is agreed by the other (delegation of power) or
either or both of the them bring the disagreement to be settled before the
Pre-Trial. The court did not provide clear reasoning for why it departed from
the plain language of the rules and the precedent mentioned above.
Therefore, based on the rules and precedent mentioned here, the judge
who intends to dismiss have to wait until the other agrees or disagrees with
him. If either of them submits the disagreement for settlement at a later time,
the case should go forward to the Trial Chamber without a super-majority
vote to the contrary, which is the same result as Scenario Two and Scenario
Three.

IV. Other Suggestions
A judge, a co-investigating judge, a co-prosecutor the Head of the
Defense Support Section, the Victims Support Section, the Civil Party Lead
Co-Lawyers and the Director or Deputy Director of the Office of
Administration may request for amendments of Internal Rules to the Rules
and Procedure Committee as soon as possible if the in course of ECCC

In May 2011, former international Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley, acting on his own,
filed a request for additional investigative actions in Case 003 in an effort to ensure that
the case would not be dismissed without a proper investigation. The CIJs rejected
Cayley’s request, finding that the Internal Rules “leave no room for … solitary action”
except by delegation of power or after the registration of a disagreement. On appeal, the
international PTC Judges reaffirmed the Court’s previous rulings. However, the
national Pre-Trial Chamber judges agreed with the CIJs without acknowledging or
providing any reasoning for their departure from the Chamber’s prior decisions. See
John D. Ciorciari, Anne Heindel, Experiments In International Criminal Justice:
Lessons From The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 Mich. J. Int’l L. 369. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 11].
24
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proceedings, a question arises which is not addressed by these Internal
Rules.25
There are no past instances that one of the parties request an
amendments of Internal Rules. However, based on the Internal Rules itself,
request for amendments is still a feasible way to promote the process of the
case.

25

Internal Rules 2 and Internal Rules 3.
20

